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Abstract—Social network companies maintain complete visibil-
ity and ownership of the data they store. However users should be
able to maintain full control over their content. For this purpose,
we propose WARP, an architecture based upon Information-
Centric Networking (ICN) designs, which expands the scope of
the ICN architecture beyond media distribution, to provide data
control in social networks. The benefit of our solution lies in the
lightweight nature of the protocol and in its layered design. With
WARP, data distribution and access policies are enforced on the
user side. Data can still be replicated in an ICN fashion but we
introduce control channels , named thread updates, which ensures
that the access to the data is always updated to the latest control
policy. WARP decentralizes the social network but still offers
APIs so that social network providers can build products and
business models on top of WARP. Social applications run directly
on the user’s device and store their data on the user’s butler
that takes care of encryption and distribution. Moreover, users
can still rely on third parties to have high-availability without
renouncing their privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks (OSNs) such as Facebook, Twitter,
Google+, Myspace, LinkedIn, etc. have become irreplaceable
for staying in touch with friends. The reason behind their
success is that they enable forming virtual communities. As a
consequence the data shared over an OSN can be very personal
and demand immediacy from the provider.
OSNs gather huge amount of data about their users, and are
now the real custodians of people’s identity. Some OSNs even
allow third party’s software to use this knowledge1 in order
to improve the user experience. Social data can also be used
to infer people’s interests in order to win their attention and
deliver messages more effectively, such as advertisements [24].
The OSN platform can also be used by governments and legal
agencies to observe and monitor the user’s activities [16].
Despite the wide success of social networking, there are
controversial aspects to delegating the ownership of social
content to the OSNs providers. Currently OSNs maintain
ownership of both the social graph and the shared data [33]
and they often share them for profit or for legal interception,
sometimes without the explicit consent of the user. Further,
some information regarding one user might be subject to the
1An example is the protocol Facebook Connect [11].
privacy settings of one of his social connections, resulting in
privacy leaks.
Recent research efforts [35], [32], [38], [10], as well as
commercial initiatives [1], have proposed to decentralize the
social network so that users can maintain control over their
data. Concurrently, the research community has developed
new ideas for an Internet architecture that can better serve
the needs of users and developers. In particular, Information
Centric Networking (ICN) architectures focus on connect-
ing users to data instead of setting up connections between
machines. Namely, ICN architectures aim at decoupling the
data from a specific location in the network and at enabling
location/identity separation: a file has a unique name that is
independent from the address of the machine where it is stored,
and which is used to route to any copy of the data. By doing
this, it is possible to fetch the data from any of its replicas
in the network and to cache data on any router in order to
prevent unwarranted network traffic.
It is our belief that ICN architectures are now mature
enough to overcome the network issues that distributed social
networking has faced so far. Therefore, we propose a solution
that implements all the functionality common to social net-
works while leaving to the users in full control of their data.
Furthermore, our solution is compatible with the value add of
current OSN providers.
In this paper we present the WARP framework, that is: an
architecture that allows users to share data, potentially over
the infrastructure of an OSN provider, but which prevents the
OSN provider to access to the user’s data without the explicit
consent of the user.
Let us, for instance, consider Facebook. At the moment, the
”Facebook application” is a software that runs on their servers
in their data center, and the end-user chooses how to interface
to it, either via a web-browser or a mobile application. In other
words, data is generated at the source by the user, and then
moved to Facebook. Then Facebook manages and distributes
the data. We want to reverse this scheme in an ICN fashion
by having a Facebook application running on the source of
the data, i.e. the user device. The application must have the
duty of collecting the data from the users, whatever this data
is, and pass it to the WARP framework which then takes care
of encrypting and distributing the data to the network as a
authenticated source.
Note that Facebook can still distribute the data, for instance
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to improve the performance or offering the distribution service
in exchange of showing their advertisement. WARP only
guarantees to the user that his data will not be accessible
unless he decides to grant to Facebook the right to access
it. Our ultimate goal is to show that, with minor changes, ICN
does this by design, and that additionally, it is possible to use
WARP to build a shared social infrastructure as an overlay of
the current Internet that is able to serve both the interests of
OSNs and the rights of the users.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next
section, we review the related work for both privacy preserv-
ing OSN mechanisms and Information-Centric Networks. In
Section III, we provide motivation and technical requirements
for our architecture. We then describe our architecture in
Section IV, with the details of the protocol in Section V. We
evaluate the framework in Section VI, before concluding the
work in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Information Centric Networking
Information Centric Networking[2] describes network archi-
tectures that use data retrieval primitives, i.e. put/get, in place
of the primitives for machine-to-machine message delivery,
i.e. send/listen. The final goal is to decouple applications
from topology and fetch data from anywhere in the network,
including transparent caches. Traffic in the Internet follows
a power law distribution where a significant fraction of the
traffic comes from a rather restricted number of items. For
this reason, as the cost of storage decreases much faster than
the cost of bandwidth, inserting storage within the network as
proposed by ICN protocols appears to be a valid alternative
to the current architecture.
ICNs usually rely on two types of packets, data and requests.
Data packets simply contain the content object. The content is
uniquely named, signed and, since there is no access control
on the network caches, encrypted by their producer for security
reasons. Requests, intuitively, are the messages used to fetch
data. How to route content requests is a critical issue for ICN
protocols. Some architectures, such as [25], [9], use name
resolvers to locate content. This solution, however, is less
responsive to changes and is exposed to attacks, such as DoS.
Alternatively, architectures such as [19], [37] use routing tables
or hybrid schemes. For name resolution, the reader is reminded
of [39], [18].
By design, ICN architectures secure the data instead of the
communication channel. However, since the producer has no
control over the replicas of its data, their application to social
networking is very limited. A trivial example is the following:
let us imagine that a content, say A, is initially shared by
Alice with all her friends. After a few of her friends have
downloaded A, A is replicated on several distributors. If now
Alice wants to withdraw the permission of reading A from
Bob, she must first ensure that all the copies of A stored in
caches are voided and replaced with the new version of A.
This is required to avoid that Bob fetches the first version of
A that he is able to decrypt. The task is made difficult for
Alice since the data could have been replicated several times
on caches that are unknown to her.
B. Privacy Preserving Social Content Distribution
PrPl [35] and Musubi [10], have deeply inspired this work
since, to the best of our knowledge, these were the first
research projects that aimed at decentralizing modern social
networks. Despite sharing the same goal, though, their nature
is very different from WARP’s. In fact, they focus on the
application support, and specifically on distributed search
indexing. WARP proposes a new network infrastructure for
distributing data in an efficient and secure manner. For this
reason WARP has to be considered complementary to these
projects and integrating all solutions together is the final goal.
Another similar project is Tribler [32]. Tribler, differently
from PrPl and Musubi, does take care of the connectivity
aspects of distributed OSN although in a differently manner
from WARP. It is not a generic architecture and cannot
easily interface with the OSN software; moreover it relies on
gossiping information across a P2P network and is intrinsically
subject to high latencies and provides inadequate real-time
notification support.
Cachet [28] addresses a similar problem as WARP. It
implements distributed social feeds, policy based encryption
and even offline persistency (which WARP does not entirely
support at the moment). However, Cachet has three substantial
limitations: (1) by admission of its authors, the computational
overhead needed to secure access and updates on the DHT
is not sustainable; (2) it relies on proxies to re-encode the
content and to revoke keys; and (3) it is limited to the news
feed type of content whereas WARP allows to develop any
kind of software and to enhance it with social functionality.
For the sake of precision, Cachet boosts its performance by
implementing a gossip-based social caching, although it cannot
outperform WARP’s structured cache search algorithm.
Other relevant projects include Diaspora [6], PeerSon [7],
Safebook [8], LotusNet [3] and SCOPE [26]. These projects
implements subsets of Cachet’s functionality and for this
reason will not be discussed further in this paper. The reader
is referred to the original papers for the details.
III. ARCHITECTURAL REQUIREMENTS
A. Requirements
Aside from the business incentives issue of protecting the
data from the big data analysis of the OSN platform, there are
several technical issues in decentralizing the social network.
Those corresponds to some requirements that our framework
needs to satisfy. We outline these (in no order of importance):
• Timing: The Internet is today a real living network. Social
content is produced as part of the daily routine and must be
delivered in real-time to all its recipients. Real-time feeds, such
as the facebook newsfeed, usually carry small amounts of data
including text, web-links, picture thumbnails, etc. However,
they require almost immediate transfer of data, unlike, say,
P2P content distribution mechanisms.
• Visibility and privacy: People share personal data daily -
e.g. opinions, thoughts, political views, pictures, videos etc. -
with their friends and acquaintances but not necessarily with
everyone. Current solutions rely on authenticated connections
and Access Control List (ACL) [36] to discriminate whether a
content can be downloaded or not. To implement the same
method in a decentralized manner can be computationally
unsustainable. However the ICN approach overcomes this
issue by securing the data rather than the connection. We will
expand upon this point in the rest of the paper.
• Scalability: Social networks sites commonly rely on pro-
prietary large scale data centers for their storage. They also
rely on Content Delivery Networks (CDN), such as Akamai,
for content delivery. A sample architecture is represented. This
solution is highly scalable and fault-tolerant but rarely leaves
the user with full control over his data; the users cannot, for
instance, decide where unencrypted data are stored, how many
times it is replicated and, more importantly, how fast access
to data can be revoked. All the previous works minimally
use caching: each user is considered responsible for his own
content and serves all the requests. In our context, each user is
typically a recipient of several hundreds of feeds and also has
as many followers. While the current framework uses the OSN
servers as aggregators, a decentralized solution opens new
scalability issues and a potentially unsustainable overhead. Our
solution will have to satisfy this requirement.
B. High level view of WARP
We now describe a high level view of WARP. We propose
an open infrastructure to decentralize the distribution of social
data whilst enforcing user’s privacy. WARP allows to dissem-
inate social data in an ICN fashion, leaving to the user the op-
portunity of deciding the right tradeoff between performance,
security and control on his own data. The protocol is based
on a hierarchical name resolver to facilitate routing without
lacking information about users’ activities.
Data security is enforced using a combination of symmetric
cryptography and Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) similarly
to what is done in [21], [20] but with the only difference that
WARP does not depend on proxies for content updates.
Content updates are taken care of by implementing a two-
way agreement between the producer of the original content
and the producer of the update. Namely, assuming the case of
a comment on a Facebook post, the first user (who owns the
post) will agree to link the content update to his Facebook wall
as long as the second user gives a signed certificate of what
its comment contains and what the name of the data is. By
creating this link, the owner of the wall prevents two problems,
first: it links only comments that it consider appropriate and
reputable; second, it certifies to his audience that they have not
been compromised afterwards; at the same time the content
update is bound with its actual producer, who is also be
responsible for its distribution.
Instead of implementing a key-revocation protocol, when-
ever security policies change, the cached objects are deleted, or
substituted with a newly encrypted version. This is made possi-
ble by using control channels, named thread updates which are
used for delivering commands to the content distributors. Note
that the thread updates are content and therefore are routed,
requested and even cached (only by distributors).
It is important to remark that we enforce caching to take
care of the bursty nature of content requests [40] more than
for long term data distribution.
C. A Motivating Example
This section is meant to help the reader understand how
WARP changes the normal workflow of social network. Let
us consider the case of two users, Alice and Bob, who want
to use a Facebook-like application (FL) built for the WARP
architecture.
1) Both the users must have control of a butler for their
online identity. The butler is the host of the user’s social
data as well as its guardian. This can be available both as
paid service, ad-based service, or a always- connected
set-top-box. For simplicity, hereafter we will consider
this last case only, moreover even though WARP sup-
ports mobile devices, as described in section-, for the
moment we will consider the content to be created on
the butler as well.
2) Both users have to create their own WARP identity,
registering to an Identity Authority (IA)that, at its own
condition, does nothing more than sign and authenticate
Alice’s and Bob’s public keys. The IA can be any institu-
tion that is widely considered reputable and trustworthy,
including an OSN of the user’s choice.
3) Without regard to what social software Bob and Alice
are going to use they are already able to establish a
social relationship as a mere exchange of keys between
their butlers. Friendships are defined by assigning a user
to one or more categories - e.g. ”friend”, ”colleague”
or ”family”. Moreover each user always belongs to a
group consisting of himself only. Let us assume that
Alice categorizes Bob as friend whereas Bob categorizes
Alice as ”colleague”.
4) Alice and Bob install on their butler the FL software
which has the following duties: offer a user interface,
compile the data in the application format, interface with
the butler’s database to store the data thereof, choose
what groups can access to the content created.
5) Alice has not privacy issues; however she does not
want to use her own bandwidth to distribute her FL
data. Therefore she chooses to distribute everything
named under Alice/facebook/ using the FL infrastructure
(the service can be offered behind payment or as ad-
supported).
6) Bob is not concerned about bandwidth consumption
and does not want to pay cloud service to distribute
his data. Instead he organizes a P2P network with his
closest friends that become distributors of his content.
in exchange he does the same. (IMPORTANT: Links
are chosen based on well-known literature on tit-for-tat,
social routing, social caching etc.)
7) Alice shares her newsfeed with all her friends and so
does Bob. In this case, Bob will be able to follow Alice’s
feed whereas Alice cannot do the same with Bob’s,
moreover Alice’s will not even be able to see if Bob
is writing on his wall because she will not be able to
identify what the data objects are.
8) When Bob wants to see Alice’s stream the FL appli-
cation takes care of identifying all the chunks of the
stream, download them, decrypt them and print them on
the screen aggregated with all news of Bob’s friends.
9) Whenever Alice wants to publish something that Bob
should not see she can add to the feed a post with a
content specific policy, that excludes Bob from the au-
dience. For instance by replacing the group ”friend” with
the id of every single friend beside Bob, or creating a
new group and distributing the new keys to its members.
In this case Bob will be able to see that the network
object (because he has access to the stream). However
he will not be able to decrypt the post.
10) In order to change the access to a content that has
already been published, the user has nothing else to do
than simply change the policy on it. The butler will take
care of voiding every cached copy. The new copy will be
distributed by the butler upon request. Note that when a
member is removed from a group, the keys for that group
must be redistributed in order to avoid a massive key
exchange. For this scenario, we propose a load balancing
solution, see section IV-E.
As we can see in this example, both users select the privacy
level they would like to achieve. Users are able to change
privacy setting, and to revoke authorization to access content,
even though this content has been distributed in the wild.
IV. ARCHITECTURE
A. Data Naming
WARP organizes content in network objects that are
uniquely named using the following structure:
x.y/<application>/<folder>/.../<appendix>
There must be at least three segments divided by a backslash.
The first one is always in the form x.y where y is the
user name of the producer and x is the IA that certifies his
identity and signs his public keys. The segment application is
a unique identifier for the software that compiled the content.
The remaining part of the name is organized as file-system,
the segments in the middle are folders and are used for
both organization and routing purposes. As last, the appendix,
identifies the network object within its folder. Segments are
named using a random generator to make content untraceable
and avoid leaking information about its nature, for instance a
picture named ”Me and Paul at Hawaii”, only the username
and the application name is kept in a human readable format.
B. Butlers and Distributors
A WARP network is a two-tier overlay composed of butlers
and distributors.
As in [35], a butler is a service that can be run on a set-top-
box at home, or as a paid or ad-supported service by a vendor
of choice. Every user in the social network must have a butler
that serves four fundamental tasks: establishing social links
with the other butlers, interfacing with the social applications;
storing the user’s data; and organizing data distribution.
Users establish their social relationship directly from the
butler interface. The OSN accounts will be dismissed, so that
there will be only one global social graph. A relationship is
established when the user categorize the identity of another
user. Thanks to the expressivity of ABE [14], this allows both
symmetrical, as in Facebook, or asymmetrical, as in Twitter,
relationship. A sketch of a butler’s internals is showed in Fig.
1a. At the top of the stack, there is the social application that
interfaces with the butler locally or via Remote Process Call.
The latter is a strong requirement of our design since content
is often generated and consumed from mobile devices. WARP
APIs only allow the social application to store their data in the
local storage and communicate whether they should be made
available to the network. The data distribution and encryption
are entirely managed by the WARP DISTRIBUTION LOGIC.
The social application cannot decide, for example, who will
be able to see the data and not even what the data name is
going to be.
A butler is always the root source of the user’s content.
It can distribute the data as a stand-alone server or using
distributors that behave similarly to ICN caches. A distributor
can be: any trustworthy butler, if users want to share their
data in a pure peer-to-peer fashion; a paid cloud service, if
performance are a concern; or an ad-based service offered,
for instance, by the company that developed the social appli-
cation. In order to be become a distributor a host receives a
Distribution Certificate:
DistC = {x.y, f,Df , DK , Texp}PKx.y
where x.y is the butler identity, f is the folder that must be
distributed, Df is a list of all the distributors of f and all
its subfolders, DK is a key that must be used to decrypt part
of the content that are for the distributor’s view only, and
Texp is the expiration date of the certificate–the certificate is
signed with the public key of the user. A key point of our
architecture is that a distributor is not necessarily a single
machine, a distributor can be the entire Akamai network for
instance. An IA must certify the distributor identity and which
machines are attributable to it. WARP does not specify how a
distributor must balance the load of request across its servers.
WARP’s distributors differ from ICN caches because they
must monitor the updates of the content they store via control
channels, named thread update, that deliver information about
the cached content. Thread updates deliver two types of
information: (1) notify security updates, e.g. a newly encrypted
version of the content, and (2) notify the creation of new
related content in order to allow prefetching.
(a) A sketch of the internals of a butler. Note that the social application can interact
locally or remotely via RPC. (b) The structure of a network object
Fig. 1:
C. Cryptography and Credentials
Content is authenticated with signatures generated using
any public-key scheme, such as DSA [17] or ECDSA [22],
that guarantees confidentiality2. At the current state of the art
we rely on the IA to authenticate the public keys. However
we conjecture that, given the nature of WARP, PGP [13] and
a web-of-trust [34] can suffice for the task. In any case we
consider the problem of key authentication beyond the scope
of this paper.
Privacy, is enforced using a combination symmetric and
attribute based encryption (ABE) [14]. ABE is an asymmetric
scheme adapted for broadcast encryption [12]. It gives fine
control over the audience of a private message. The cyphertext
is encrypted with a policy expressed as a boolean expression.
Variables, named attributes, are connected by the operators
AND(∧), OR(∨) and k-of-n. Every user possesses a private-
key that is associated with some of such attributes and is able
to decrypt the cyphertext if these satisfy the encrypting policy.
For example, let us consider a secret s that should be read
only by friends, school acquaintances and teammates, s will
be encrypted with a policy:
P = friend ∨ (acquaintance ∧ school) ∨ teammate
. P allows anybody with the attribute ”friend” or ”teammate”
to decrypt, although the attribute ”acquaintance” alone will not
suffice unless it is combined with ”school”.
Performance-wise, ABE, as most of asymmetric encryption
schemes, is sensibly slower than symmetric cryptography thus
WARP secures the data using a secret key (sk) that is en-
crypted with ABE and distributed together with the cyphertext.
D. Key-distribution
Butlers exchange keys on a as-needed basis, only when
some content has to be decrypted and not when the users
define their relationship. The reason for doing so is that, as in
[31], keys have an expiration date, in the order of a week or
a month. If two users do not interact often it is pointless to
exchange keys. For the same reason, users should maintain a
pool of recent keys in the eventuality that they have to decrypt
2not all the schemes guarantee confidentiality. For instance, Identity Based
Encryption (IBE) [27] does not
a content that was encrypted with one of the previous keys.
The key point here is that WARP does not revoke keys in
the proper sense but instead revokes the cyphertext from the
caches.
The butler automatically assigns a random alias to every
known user so that content can be encrypted for a single user
only–and also this because it is needed by our key-revocation
scheme.
Each content stored in the butler has two associate policies: a
Follower policy (FP), that specify who can access the content
and Distributor Policies (DP) that is used to encrypt the fields
that are supposed to be read by the distributors only. Whether
a distributor can also decrypt the content or not is up to the
user.
E. Key-Revocation
Key revocation at the scale of a social network is a critical
matter due to the fact that users have often hundreds to a
thousand friends [5]. Without loss of generality, let us consider
the case of a content c encrypted using a single-attribute policy
p = friend. In order to oust a user from the audience its
producer must: (1) create a new version of the attribute, say
friend′, (2) for each key containing the attribute friend
distribute a new one containing the new attribute friend′, (3)
the butler re-encrypts c with policy p′ = friend′. Similarly to
[23], we work around this problem by using aliases of users’
identities.
The butler assigns an extra attribute, named bucket, to each
known user. A bucket is an integer between 0 and K where K
is a constant parameter. When a user, say B, is revoked of the
attribute, say a, the new policy will be such that the presence
of a will be conditioned to the presence of every bucket
beside B’s or the individual identity of every user included
in B’s bucket except B. This solution prevents the number of
attributes from growing linearly with the number of users as
long as the parameter K is chosen adequately. Moreover, since
keys are redistributed periodically, the impaired policy will be
enforced only until the new attributes will be generated.
F. Content
Data in the network is organized as a collection of network
objects, as in Fig. 1b, that can contain data, a reference to
(a) A possible organization of network objects to recreate a Facebook-like timeline. The index of the folder x.y/timeline keeps track of the latest segment of the news feed
which is organized as a WARP feed. Each entry of the timeline reference an external object, from left to right: a status update from the user, a picture from another application,
and the comment of another user. The social application ”timeline” will take care of aggregating the content and show it to the user.
another object or both. Public fields contain general infor-
mation about the object, they are: Content Name,Version,
Application and Signature. Followers fields are accessible
only to followers, the most important is one Secret Key that
is used to encrypt the data. Reference is used to redirect to
another object while the other fields readable to the followers
are use to link objects together and htey are explained in the
next section.
There are onyl two Distributors fields: Thread Update
Name and Thread Update Pointer. These are the name of
the control channel for the content and a pointer to its latest
message at the time the object was created.
1) Feeds, Fragmented Files and Indexes: WARP essentially
offers two data structures to organize content: Feeds and
Fragmented Files. A feed is a chain of objects doubly-linked
with each other using the fields Next and Previous, as in Fig
2a. It is meant to be used for unbounded streams of data, for
example the Facebook timeline. Each chunk of the stream is
anonymized as any other name in the network and this is the
reason why objects must be linked to each other.
Fragmented files are meant for bulky static data - such
as pictures, audio, video etc - that are too big to be kept
in one single content object and can be more efficiently
encrypted and fetched as fragments. Every fragment
has to be in the same folder, but, instead of being
linked as a feed, their name can be generated using the
Segment Seed contained within each fragment. For
example, given a folder /x.y/photos/AFAFA/),
a seed s and a hashing function h the fragments
name will be /x.y/photos/AFAFA/h(seed,1)),
/x.y/photos/AFAFA/h(seed,2)); the number of
fragments is known from the field Number of Segment.
This method is preferable to a feed because it allows
fragments to be downloaded in parallel, although it has the
disadvantage that if one fragments name is changed then also
all the others must be changed (a feed can be modified more
efficiently).
Up to this point we only discussed about objects that are
anonymized, namely their name cannot be known before hand,
although a social application needs to know what objects
represent what, and what their name is. For this reason, WARP
allows every application prefix (which are the only content
names that are not anonymized) to answer with an object,
named index, that work as an entry point for the application
data. The object, can for instance maintain a pointer to the
latest object of a feed, or maintain a directory of all the pictures
stored in one’s photobook.
V. PROTOCOL
A. Protocol Messages
As discussed in Section II, ICN protocols generally use two
types of messages, requests and data. WARP introduces two
additional types of messages: RESOLVE and NOTIFY.
A RESOLVE message is used to obtain a list of distributors
for a given folder. This type of query can be answered
authoritatively only by the producer of the content or a
distributor for a parent folder. In other words, considering the
name x.y/folder1/folder2/name1 a butler that does
not know a distributor for x.y/folder1/folder2/ can
obtain a list of distributors by sending a query to the butler
x.y or any distributor for x.y/folder1/. This far we have
not mentioned how to resolve machine addresses. Generally
speaking since both butlers and distributors rely on the IA to
certify their identity, as long as the identity is associated with
a domain name the name can be resolved using the normal
DNS infrastructure.
NOTIFY messages are one of the core ideas of WARP.
They are sent by a butler to another to inform that a content
has been created. They are fundamental to implement common
functionality - such as comments, re-post, likes and re-tweets
- since in WARP a network object cannot be modified by any-
body that is not its producer. By design, content aggregation
is operated at the application level rather than at the storage
level. Namely, assuming the case of Alice adding a post on
her Facebook wall and Bob commenting on it, in WARP there
would be three distinct objects. Alice’s post, Bob’s comment
and Alice’s link to Bob’s comment. A notify message contains
a content-name, a signed checksum of the related data and an
application identifier that says which application has generated
the content.
B. Thread Updates
Thread Updates (TUs) are implemented as any other feed in
the WARP network with the only difference that they deliver
commands to caches. Every network object is associated to a
TU and carries a pointer to the latest object of the feed at the
time it was created. Ideally content that are in the same TU
should belong together so that for instance a comment belongs
to the thread of the original post. However, we did not want to
leave this kind of freedom to the developer and therefore we
are using the following convention. Each folder is monitored
by its own TU. However, since TUs are also content and can
be monitored in the same way, each TU is monitored by the
TU of its parent folder. This allows the distributors to have
a finer control of what TUs to follow, for instance if a cloud
service is distributing the entirety of a user’s data it can follow
a single thread for the user. If it is only distributing his photo
album, it will monitor only the folder containing its pictures.
The commands that a distributor receives from a TU are the
following:
ADD(X) X has been created. The distributor can decide
whether to prefetch X or not.
DELETE(X) X must be purged from the cache and never
distributed again.
UPDATE(X,Y) X has been updated with Y. The distributor
must purge X, and can decide whether to download Y or not.
CUT(X,Y,X’,Y’) A feed has been cut from X to Y. All
the objects in between must be purged from the cache, the
distributor can decide whether to download X’ and Y’ to merge
the remaining pieces.
For our future work we are considering implementing a
command that distributes only a differential of an updated
object containing renewed version of the secret key and a
new signature. However there are security issues to take into
account and we do not consider this optimization at the
moment.
C. Fetching of data
Butlers and distributors maintain a routing table to direct
their request. Each entry of the routing table contains a folder,
a distributor and the expiration of the content. New requests
that do not match any entry of the table trigger the butler to
resolve the name and add a new entry to the routing table.
D. Serving Data
In the generic ICN architecture, whenever a cache, or a
router, is requested for a content it verifies if there is a copy
in its storage. Otherwise it forwards the request to another
cache to obtain a copy. Whenever the copy arrives, it can
decide whether it should be cached or not. WARP approach
is slightly different since it must consider the thread updates.
The logic for serving an incoming request for a content R:
1. The distributor verifies whether the content is in the
Content Store, if not it continues at point 5.
2. Consider TUR the Thread Update of R, if TUR has been
recently read the content is considered updated, then continue
at 6.
3. Fetch TUR.
4. Read TUR and update the Content Store accordingly, if
the content is still updated continue at 7.
5. Fetch R from another distributor
6. Serve Request
7. If R is not a popular content then terminate.
8. If TUR or any of its parent TUs are balready being
followed, add it to the list of threads that must be followed
10. Cache R in the Content Store
E. Continuous Polling
A possible attack that can tamper the cache control mech-
anism of WARP is continuous polling: a malicious butler
generates requests at a high frequency so that it can receive
every version of a content before being excluded from the
followers. This problem can be solved on the distributor side
by implementing a Request Ban Window (RBW), for every
open connection distributors keep track of when each a butler
is allowed to send a new request, if a request arrives before
then they do not serve it. Also, whenever they receive a request
from the butler they update the RBW to the maximum between
its current value and the value of a function:
TRBW (t) = current time +
{
fail(t, δ)
1 + succ(t, δ)
· δ
where fail(t, delta) and succ(t, δ) respectively are the num-
ber of failed and successful requests that a butler has sent in the
latest time window of length delta. Note that TRBW (t) scales
the RBW δ according to the hit-ratio of the butlers request, if
the requests are mostly successful - i.e. there is a burst of data
to download - the butler is allowed to send requests faster,
differently, if the requests are unsuccessful the time window
grows. Butlers that respect the suggested inter-request time
will never have their requests rejected whereas butlers that do
not will delay their opportunity of downloading.
F. Application
Due to space constraints, we cannot give an extensive
discussion on WARP’s APIs although in Fig ?? we outline
the content design of Facebook-like timeline. The figures show
how easily the timeline can be embedded into a WARP’s feed
to notify the creation of new data objects. The index of the
application maintains a reference to the latest portion of the
feed so that an application can always request only the latest
news. Content is generated by social applications that store it
into the butler’s DB via APIs, for this purpose WARP APIs
offer all the CRUD3 functionality. Additionally, the application
is allowed to compile the index file of its folder, create feeds
and map DB content into network objects. Moreover, they can
subscribe to be notified whenever a NOTIFY message arrives
to the butler. Social applications that run directly on the butler
can be prevented from accessing to the network and distribute
unencrypted data of the user, their mobile instances however
could maliciously read the content storage and transfer the
data somewhere else. In order to prevent this problem mobile
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instances can only read from the database the data that they
produced.
VI. EVALUATION
1) Key-Revocation: As opposed to what was done by [28],
[21], [20], [15] for social networking and by [41] for cloud
storage, we decided not to use proxies the key revocation
process. While we do not consider the trustworthiness of proxy
a real issue, since all the centralized part of such systems are
generally assumed reputable, our concern are centered around
scalability. Proxies are intermediaries that take part in every
decrypt operation. This would imply that every data transfer
in the network would at one point end in a proxy transaction,
and this would include very simple operations such as, for
instance, likes on Facebook. Moreover, some proxies need part
of the cyphertext in order to complete the transaction which
would cause an additional cost in terms of redundant network
traffic that we are trying to avoid. In WARP key revocation
maps into voiding cached content and re-encoding the content
upon request. It is important to remember that interest for
social content has generally a very short life-span. Therefore,
as long as access rules are properly set when the content is
generated, re-encoding might not even be used without the
need to pay the cost of a proxy transaction every time the
content is accessed.
Another observation that can be made about WARP’s revo-
cation procedure is whether the dimension of the FP grows
linearly with the number of attributes, as discussed in section
IV-E. Attributes are expanded only and if the content has
to be re-encoded during its popular period. Since keys are
periodically changed, attributes can be shrunk again at the
first key renewal. Furthermore we load-balance the problem by
uniformly sub-dividing the users into buckets. As long as the
number of buckets is properly chosen [4], the chances of using
high-number of attributes are low. As a ground rule we do not
consider policy changes to be frequent enough to justify the
network and computational overhead of using proxies. WARP
pays the computational cost of re-encrypting the content when
policies change, although it does that in lazy manner, namely
when it is needed. Content that is not popular anymore might
not have to be re-encrypted at all.
2) Thread-Updates: every cache should periodically ping a
control channel to verify that the content of its cache is still
valid, the might be a concern regarding the overhead induced
by the TUs. To answer this question, the reader must consider
that thread updates are network objects in the same manner any
other content in the WARP network; therefore they obey to the
same distribution process. In other words they can be cached
and re-distributed as well. This implies that on the butler side
the cost of delivering such information can be very low if the
distribution chain is properly set. Moreover, on the distributor
side the cost is still fairly low considered that policy are not
updated frequently and that request for updates can be sent
with a granularity of choice, not to mention that they have
the bandwidth occupation of only a few packets. For instance,
a distributor can commit to enforce new policies only once
every 30 minutes. Currently a normal CDN uses way more
bandwidth only to verify which machines are still alive and
which ones are not [30].
3) Distribution: Data distribution in the WARP network
is intentionally kept as flexible as possible. The solutions
mentioned earlier - i.e. centralized, peer-to-peer and multi-
tier - are not offered by any previous work. Cachet has the
advantage of offering offline data distribution which WARP
does not offer because the butler has to take action after
receiving a NOTIFY message, although we consider this a
minor considered that the whole point of WARP is to prevent
personal data to be replicated without control. Beside this
aspect though, performance-wise there is not a real comparison
between the two protocols. As Cachet is DHT-based content, it
requires on average O(logN) steps away to reach the requester.
WARP on the other hand can resolve the list of distributors
in constant time without regard to the amount N of users that
can be in the order of tens of millions to even billions. Their
use of social caching, while effective, relies on the number of
connections opened and, as shown in their result, is effective
only as long as requests are sent to about 40% of the contacts.
WARP structured approach never sends a request to more than
one distributor.
VII. DISCUSSION
Misuse of social networks intrinsically leads to lack of
privacy, and WARP cannot prevent poor decisions in content
sharing. If a user is initially granted access to a content and
manages to download it before the permissions have been
revoked, little can be done beside trusting that the butler
has not been compromised, namely the butler should cache
content, for performance reasons, but not maintain a persistent
copy of it. WARP, as Facebook and the other OSNs, has
a best-effort approach. Once data have been delivered to a
follower there is no guarantee that they will not be duplicated
by the user. However, if they are not duplicated, subsequent
downloads will be denied to access the content. Users can aid
by maintaining a web-of-trust and avoiding sharing content
with people who are known to use butlers that are not conform
to the standard.
While this problem is common to all the solutions men-
tioned in II WARP has the advantage of letting the user choose
the right tradeoff of privacy, performance and cost. At one
extreme, a user may want the highest level of privacy and
distributes his own data himself. Such user can be any artist
who wants to have a fine-control over who access his material.
At the other extreme, a user and his friends can organize a
peer-to-peer network because they do not want to support a
private company. In the first case, the cost is high but privacy
is guaranteed because, not only the content is encrypted but
also connections can be authenticated. In the latter case, there
is no cost at all but privacy is not guaranteed if one or more
users are malicious.
In our belief, most of the users will compromise by dis-
tributing their content via a OSN, or cloud storage, because
it will allow maintaining the same performance of the current
network but without lacking privacy on the distribution side.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we presented WARP: a scalable ICN archi-
tecture that supports social networking with no limitations on
both the user and the vendor side. The main contribution of
WARP consists in offering a unique solution to the most recent
privacy violations and to the current limitations of Information
Centric Networking. A first version of the architecture has
been implemented on top of CCNx [29], working around
the limitation of the NDN architecture. While it helped dis-
covering all the issues that we tackled with this work, the
implementation is far from the current design of WARP. Future
work consists of re-writing the network logic of WARP and to
release the first sample applications. Additionally, our priority
is also to explore the scientific aspects of ICN and social
network, we believe that there is a lot that can be done,
especially for caching, leveraging on the information given
by the social graph. Ultimately, while bulk data distribution
will be most likely operated by third parties, we believe that
real-time content such as status updates, tweets and messages
can be distributed in a P2P fashion.
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